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Macedonia held elections on 11 December which took place against the backdrop of a major
political crisis. Misha Popovikj assesses the results of the election, writing that although it remains
unclear which parties will be able to form the next government, there has been a clear shift in the
balance of power which opens the door to tackling corruption among elected officials.
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On 11 December, the citizens of Macedonia voted on what international observers (the OSCE/ODIHR) indicated
were ‘competitive’ elections. While this peculiar term might conjure up the image of a clear contest between
candidates, it also demonstrated the distance Macedonia remains from the ideal of ‘fair’ and ‘credible’ elections. The
latter term was the implicit goal set out by the European Union and the United States when it became clear that fair
elections were not reachable in this small Balkan state.
In the immediate aftermath of the vote, the EU’s High Representative, Federica Mogherini, alongside Commissioner
Johannes Hahn, expressed their expectation that a ‘swift formation of parliament and government and the
implementation of reforms’ would take place. But the most crucial question of all – which party has won the election
– still remained unclear. After a prolonged declaration of the initial results on 12 December, VMRO-DPMNE, the
centre-right incumbent party of the Macedonian bloc, won the highest number of seats (51). However, just behind
were the Social Democrats (SDSM), who came second with 49 seats. This signals an important shift in power
compared to the previous elections in 2014, where VMRO-DPMNE won over 60 seats in parliament with the SDSM
picking up 34.
The Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (BDI) were seemingly the biggest losers, dropping around 40% of
their seats in parliament and falling to just 10. Meanwhile, a newly formed Albanian political party, the Besa
Movement, won 5 seats, and another new group, the Alliance of Albanians, won 3 seats, with the Democratic Party
1/3
of Albanians (from which the Alliance of Albanians was a splinter group) winning 2. In addition, the SDSM, who
typically do not get many Albanian votes, received a significant proportion of support.
The final distribution of seats is nevertheless still unclear. Adding to this uncertainty is the fact that on 13 December,
the SDSM contested the voting in some polling stations, claiming it will end up with more votes than VMRO-DPMNE.
As such, the picture will remain complex until these issues are resolved.
Resolving Macedonia’s political crisis
The elections took placed against the backdrop of a protracted political crisis. At the start of 2015, the SDSM began
publishing recordings of telephone conversations that it alleged illustrated high level corruption and an abuse of
power. They claimed these audio recordings were made by the state counter-intelligence service, which illegally
intercepted thousands of officials, opposition members, journalists, businessmen and civil society activists.
During this period, there were two rounds of negotiations (in 2015 and 2016) between the four main political parties
(VMRO-DPMNE, the SDSM, the BDI and the Democratic Party of Albanians) which ended with the Pržino
Agreement, which laid out a roadmap for the subsequent elections in 2016. The country also saw mass protests in
2015 and 2016. Meanwhile, the European Union developed priorities for urgent reforms in the country, outlining
steps to improve the rule of law. These priorities ended up as a condition for starting EU accession negotiations. In
addition, a loose coalition of NGOs drafted a Blueprint for Democratic reforms, which further developed the EU’s
urgent reform priorities as detailed tasks for decisions makers.
Given this background, the campaign was unsurprisingly negative. VMRO-DPMNE played the nationalist card,
accusing the leader of the SDSM, Zoran Zaev, of working against the interests of Macedonians by promising the
country’s Albanian population a bilingual state and some form of federalisation. This was an obvious political spin on
the actual situation, given the Albanian language is already an official language in the country. However, it produced
the desired effect and the bilingual issue was one of the hot topics of the elections, since it remains controversial in a
society with complex inter-ethnic relations and the memory of an armed conflict in 2001. On the other hand, the
SDSM emphasised the issues of crime and abuse of power, the main topics of the political crisis.
Whatever the final result, the elections have ultimately shifted the balance of power in parliament. The opposition is
now much larger and very close in terms of seats to the previous governing majority. It therefore remains an open
question as to which party will lead the next government. VMRO-DPMNE, having the largest number of seats, will
be offered a mandate to do so by the President, but it is unknown how other parties, chiefly the BDI, will react.
The BDI had been in a coalition with VMRO-DPMNE, but this appears to have cost them dearly at the ballot box. On
the other hand, the BDI could see their result as the symptom of an inevitable decline in support and decide to form
a government with VMRO-DPMNE once more for the sake of securing the personal interests of its leaders. EU and
US representatives might persuade them to do otherwise, however this scenario is not entirely impossible. The new
Besa Movement appears even more reluctant to get into a partnership with VMRO-DPMNE. The support of some
Albanians for the SDSM is also a clear signal they do not support a coalition with VMRO-DPMNE. On the other
hand, a majority composed of the SDSM and all of the Albanian parties would be problematic because of the
differences that exist within the Albanian bloc.
The third scenario would be a broad government, consisting of all parliamentary parties, and tasked with carrying
out the necessary reforms required to tackle the apparent capture of the state by political actors (as shown in the
events leading up to the crisis). This government would be obliged to provide an environment not only for
competitive elections, but for fair elections.
This scenario would also reduce the costs associated with the two main Macedonian parties engaging in the
ongoing name issue with Greece. However, having VMRO-DPMNE in the government, with looming criminal
charges against their leader Nikola Gruevski and other high ranking officials, might prove to be counterproductive
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towards securing sustainable and principled reforms.
Where next?
While we wait for the outcome of the inter-party negotiations and are yet to learn who the real political winners are
from the election, some elements are already clear. First, no matter which scenario plays out, there are conditions,
at least in the parliament, to initiate a substantial reform process and deal with the urgent reform priorities which are
a necessary condition for starting negotiations with the EU over accession. However, the Parliament has
demonstrated passivity in recent history, and it is still unclear whether this new balance of power will bring back its
oversight roles over the reform agenda and its implementation.
Second, this new power balance makes it unlikely there will be enough support to abolish the Special Public
Prosecutor tasked with combating the high level corruption revealed by the SDSM’s released recordings. This
institution can play an important role in shaking the networks of corruption in the country and in initiating the criminal
prosecutions of high level officials. With a more balanced level of power in parliament, other actors in the judiciary
(mostly judges), will be more willing to work with integrity once the grasp of the political establishment decreases.
Additionally, civil society gains more leverage as the new government will not be able to disregard pressure from
below by mobilising a large parliamentary majority.
The long run effects are less clear, particularly with regard to the impact of corruption on society as a whole.
Significant parts of the country now accept some form of corruption as simply being part of the ‘rules of the game’. It
could be argued that this underpins the relatively high level of support still received by VMRO-DPMNE and the BDI.
But support for political parties is a far more complex issue and involves identity, a sense of belonging, social
networks and personal or communal interest. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that voters will completely abandon
party allegiances and switch sides without new actors in the field.
Macedonia is facing a long-term process. What is attainable in the short term is that public institutions will
appropriately act against incriminated officials within political parties and bring them to justice if they abuse their
power. This could reduce the potential for voter intimidation and loosen up the clientelistic ties that must be removed
as a prerequisite for combating state capture. The people may not have dismantled this system in these elections,
but they have nevertheless shook the foundations and provided the means for those actors with integrity within
public institutions to continue on the path toward a fairer society.
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